America’s Saturday night attacks on Iran have amplified an ever-more open debate in Tehran over the future of the country and whether Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei should remain in power.

In the days leading up to the American intervention, a group of Iranian businessmen, political and military figures, and relatives of high-ranking clerics had begun hatching a plan for running Iran without Khamenei, two sources involved in the discussions told me—whether in the event of the 86-year-old leader’s death or of his being pushed aside. Constitutionally, the Assembly of Experts, a body of 88 clerics, would need to vote to dismiss Khamenei from his position, but organizing such a vote under current circumstances is unlikely. The leader could also be more informally sidelined, say, by insiders who pressure or persuade him to pass real power to a temporary replacement. The plotters have agreed that a leadership committee consisting of a few high-ranking officials would take over running the country and negotiate a deal with the United States to stop the Israeli attacks.

The sources were fearful of being discovered but said that they were telling me of their conversations in the hope that the exposure could help them gauge regional and international response. Among the details they shared with me are that former president Hassan Rouhani, who is not involved in the discussions, is being considered for a key role on the leadership committee, and that some of the military officials involved have been in regular contact with their counterparts from a major Gulf country, seeking buy-in for changing Iran’s trajectory and the composition of its leadership.

Read: The collapse of the Khamenei doctrine

“Ours is just one idea,” one person involved in conversations told me. “Tehran is now full of such plots. They are also talking to Europeans about the future of Iran. Everybody knows Khamenei’s days are numbered. Even if he stays in office, he won’t have actual power.”

This was before the U.S. bombardment. I reached out to this person just after the explosions in Natanz, Fordo, and Isfahan, and he said, “I think the chances of us succeeding to somehow sideline Khamenei have now increased. But we are all worried and not sure. It could also go exactly the opposite way.”

The other person I spoke with who was involved in the conversations told me that he was less optimistic now about the group’s plan securing peace with the U.S. and Israel. “But even if Iran ends up choosing a belligerent position against the United States, Khamenei might have to be pushed aside,” he said.

The extent of last night’s damage is currently subject to a war of narratives between Washington and Tehran. The U.S. has averred that its bombing was a spectacular success—President Donald Trump claims to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program— while Iran has sought to downplay the destruction, claiming that it had already moved its nuclear materiel and that the strikes had not penetrated fortified sites. Either way, the mood in Iranian circles close to the regime has bifurcated, I’m told. Some insiders, including the plotters I spoke with, want to sue for a deal with Trump, even if that means ditching Khamenei. Others believe that Iran must fight back, because otherwise it will invite further aggression.

Read: The only Iran hawk is Trump

“Iran will respond and the war will expand, even if only for the time being,” Mostafa Najafi, a Tehran-based expert close to the Iranian security establishment told me shortly after the attacks.

I’d spoken to Najafi a day earlier. At that time, he told me that Iran had already readied itself for American intervention and several months of war. Despite a week of harsh Israeli assaults, Iran’s missile and drone capacities were still considerable, he’d said, adding that Iran’s long experience in asymmetric warfare left it well-situated for a prolonged battle with the United States and Israel. Iran had so far sought to avoid dragging America into the war with Israel, Najafi said—Tehran had not unleashed its regional militia allies on American interests in the region—but a U.S. direct hit could change that calculus.

Iran’s options would be limited in this regard, however. Lebanon’s Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self and has shown little interest in joining Iran’s fight with Israel and the United States. Iraq is in the midst of a national electoral campaign, making its pro-Tehran militias unlikely to want to be seen as dragging the country into a new conflict.

Some in the Iranian ruling establishment have suggested that the country will now leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty and openly pursue nuclear weaponization. This fits the belligerent tone emanating even from some centrist elements. For example, before the U.S. attack, Ali Larijani, a former speaker of parliament, personally threatened Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, saying that Iran would “come after” him after the war.

But events may be moving too fast for Khamenei to carry out longterm plans. In the days ahead, Iran may well respond with a symbolic attack, likely on U.S. bases in Iraq, Mojtaba Dehghani, a Europe-based expert with intimate knowledge of Iran’s leadership told me. But Dehghani speculated that such a move would probably expand the war and end in Khamenei’s downfall, as a rival faction would then be motivated to seize the reins and seek peace with the United States.

For years, Khamenei has led his country in chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” while avoiding fighting either on Iran’s home turf. Now Iranian territory is under fire from both. The country faces a stark choice. Either it expands the war and risks additionally antagonizing the Gulf countries that host American bases, or it seeks a historic compromise with the U.S. that would mean giving up its decades-long hostility. Khamenei’s stance is at once recalcitrant and cautious to the point of cowardice. Elites around him are wondering whether he will have to be tossed aside in pursuit of either course.