Lenin with a cat in 1922.

Stalin v Lenin

This topic has received far too little direct attention since two articles in the early 1980s by Nina Tumarkin, and although referred to in passing by many of the more recent texts that deal with post-Tsarist Russia, it deserves a more in-depth treatment than it has received thus far. By comparison with the far more well-known and well-documented Cult of Stalin, Lenin has lost out by being considerably less well documented, and as a result far less well known. Based on the number of words penned on the use of the Lenin Cult as part of Stalin’s apparatus in order to cement his position as Vozhd, the evidence is overwhelming that a Cult of Personality centred around Lenin was in existence after the latter’s death in January 1924. However, what is less certain is to what extent such a Cult predated Lenin’s demise, and was then constructed by Stalin in order to portray himself as the “high priest [… and] theorist”[1] of Leninism, thereby driving the ideals of the October Revolution and The Civil War forward. In fact, a Lenin ‘Cult’ did not exist in any meaningful way prior to his death at the age of 53. Instead, I will argue here that whilst a certain level of ‘mystique’ may have surrounded Lenin prior to his death, starting perhaps from the time of the failed attempt on his life in 1918, this did not constitute a fully formed Cult of Personality.

A posthumous Cult of Personality?

The evidence to suggest that the Lenin Cult was “posthumous”[2] as Fitzpatrick accurately describes, is truly overwhelming.  “[T]he Lenin cult [that was] so evident in the immediate aftermath of his death”[3] was the creation of Krupskaya and, to a far greater extent, Stalin, both of whom had a vested interest in erecting the Lenin Cult in order to ensure a smooth succession of power. As the “high priest” and “high priestess of the Lenin cult”[4] their ability to determine the ideological shape of post-Lenin Russia was central to stability and particularly Stalin’s rise to power. Tumarkin describes the work also undertaken by others beyond Stalin and Krupskaya to ensure that Lenin took his rightful place as the “Man-God of Communism”[5] in the Communist pantheon. Indeed, by the beginning of February 1924, the cult had already reached “nationwide”[6] proportions. To effect this end, Bonch-Bruevich had made “many of the arrangements for the portraits, sculptures, photographs and movies depicting the leader during the brief period of his active rule”[7], “Lunacharskii […] immortali[sed] Lenin as a genius and Creator […] when he took charge of the competition for the design of a permanent mausoleum of stone that would enshrine Lenin forever”[8] which would “surpass Mecca and Jerusalem in its human significance”[9]. Lenin’s funeral was the centerpiece in rolling-out the new cult to the Russian people, and Tumarkin is right to emphasize its unifying effect on the Russian people as “an organi[s]ed system of rituals and symbols whose collective function was […] to induce the public to go through the motions of revering Lenin as an outward sign of solidarity”[10]. Crucially, it was ‘organized’ and orchestrated and as I shall argue below, this was not the case to any great extent prior to the Lenin’s death. Whilst it may have been designed to unify the Russian public, it divided many in Sovnarkom. Stalin got to work as soon as he was able, throwing Trotsky off the scent immediately by establishing himself front and center during Trotsky’s vacation and convalescence at the moment of Lenin’s funeral. Service’s view that “Stalin’s leadership of the funeral commission put him at a crucial advantage”[11], due to the fact that Stalin was in many senses coming from behind in order to establish his position as a leading Bolshevik, reveals how important this leadership opportunity was for Stalin and hence how crucial it was that he took full advantage of it. Trotsky’s prominence as the facilitator of the October Revolution, Chairmanship of the Petrograd Soviet and leadership of the MRC and Red Guards allowed him to portray himself as a greater defender of the revolution than Stalin. As leader of the Red Army and Commissar for War during the Civil War from 1918 his position as de facto right hand man to Lenin was solidified even more. Whilst this is not to denigrate Stalin’s importance in these events, nonetheless he had significant ground to make up relative to Trotsky and so it was crucial that he took immediate advantage of the situation in January 1924. Furthermore, as Stalin “had no time to write a lengthy piece of work before 1917”[12] about Lenin’s work, he clearly realized that the time was right to do so. Thus, his Foundations of Leninism, published by 1924 and in that year also delivered in the form of nine lectures at the Sverdlov University[13] established Stalin not only as the rightful heir to Lenin’s throne, but also as the chief arbiter of Leninist doctrine thereafter. Montefiore’s view that “Lenin was a tower and Stalin a little finger”[14] accords perfectly with Service’s contention that Stalin was “a mere pupil of the great man”[15]; the torchbearer shining the light of Lenin’s example for all to follow. This light promised a brighter future in Russia, and in following Lenin’s lead, Stalin’s role as benevolent and selfless disciple was indisputable. In much the same way as Hitler was able to use Mein Kampf as the blueprint for the new Germany after January 30th 1933, having of course formulated his ideas in and after his incarceration in Landsberg Prison after the failed Putsch in November 1923, Stalin was able to use the Foundations of Leninism in precisely the same way. He was the keeper of Lenin’s legacy, “a village sorcerer who held his subjects in his dark thrall”[16], and as such had supreme ideological control over the Russian people, and even more crucially against ‘wreckers’, ‘deviationists’, and any others within and without the party who presumed to challenge his control. Those who stood in his way stood in Lenin’s way. Such sacrilege would be punished in the strongest possible terms; Yagoda, Yezhov and later Beria awaited with their torture chambers primed and tools sharpened. The bloodshed here, justifiable in Lenin’s own words by the epithet: “Even if 90% of the people perish, what matter if the other 10% live to see revolution become universal”[17], makes the icepick to the back of Trotsky’s head seem humane by comparison. In the later 1920s, this method of relentlessly guarding Lenin’s legacy was key to Stalin’s rise from party notable to Vozhd. The claim, then, that the Lenin cult was only constructed after his death has a lot of merit. This was indeed a powerful tool that allowed Stalin to claim that his policies were being promulgated only in accordance with Lenin’s wishes, and therefore to distance himself from much of the chaos that prevailed in the later 1920s and 30s[18]. As such, we can conclude with certainty that the cult existed after Lenin’s death. However, to do so is not to say anything new; what is both more prescient and controversial is the extent to which the cult existed prior to his death.

Folklore or cult?

That a ‘cult’ existed prior to Lenin’s death is shrouded in uncertainty not only from an historic, but also a semantic point of view. It is not the purpose of this work to deny the existence of tales and myths about Lenin prior to his death. Panchenko discusses the existence of such “folklore”[19] and the extent to which it was in fact “fakelore”[20] but confines his analysis to the period “in the first decades after the Revolution”[21] – clearly this also encompasses the years 1917-24, and therefore could imply that Lenin mythology was in existence prior to his death, however on two levels this is not compelling evidence. First of all, Panchenko’s own words are revealing: Whilst discussing such rhymes as came out about Lenin, for example “Il’ich’s red arse”[22] and the ‘Voronezh tale’ in which Lenin “chops them like a cabbage [w]ith his sharp sword”[23] (them being the whites), he states that these forms of eulogising Lenin are far more difficult to classify on the same level as the much more obvious Cult of Stalin established later on; “the cultural forms themselves, ranging from rhetoric to rituals and representing the distinctive character of the veneration of Lenin in the Soviet Union are not as homogeneous, simple and transparent”[24]. The clear implication here, then, is that its scale relative to Stalin would immediately lead us to conclude that the use of the word ‘cult’ is not appropriate. By extension, the instances that Panchenko describes seem, at least at their inception, to have no official sanction by Sovnarkom. As such, the use of the word ‘cult’ is totally misleading by this yardstick. Secondly, the latter half of Panchenko’s article deals with further instances which he describes once again as “folktales”; the ‘Muzhitskii skaz o Lenine’, published in 1924, the ‘Khitryi Lenin’ by Akul’shin, published in 1925, and ‘Lenin ne umer – on zhiv’ published in 1925-6[25]. Whilst the dates given are only those of publication, not necessarily inception, and indeed Panchenko himself claims that many were heard by the authors as early as 1918, this is scant evidence on which to claim that a cult, or even a well-established folk tradition, was in existence prior to Lenin’s death. However, Panchenko gives us a vital clue as to the nature of Lenin’s aura that pre-dated his demise, and is especially important as tales such as those examples above were a hugely important precursor to the later, fully-fledged cult that was built by Stalin after 1924, whose “contours were shaped by traditional peasant culture”[26]. These tales, then, were the early building blocks of Stalin’s cult of Lenin, but before 1924 had yet to be organized into any coherent structure.

White’s analysis develops the idea that the cult was in existence before Lenin’s death, and indeed over-extends to the point where credibility is lost. He claims, in contradiction to the ideas set-out earlier in this argument, that “Stalin did not create the Lenin Cult. He found it already in existence and propelled by the momentum that Lenin himself had given it”[27]. Perhaps the basis of White’s claim owes something to ideas such as those outlined by Panchenko above. However, by doing so we have jumped from the concept of ‘folklore’ to a ‘cult’ far too quickly. We have seen that there were indeed seeds for Stalin to nourish once the ideal situation presented itself on Lenin’s death. However, for us to accept White’s position we would have to accept two equally difficult claims. First, that Stalin’s role in creating what we would recognize as a bona-fide ‘cult’ was much less than we have already established, either before or after Lenin’s death, and second that Lenin himself played an active role in creating the cult of his own personality during his lifetime. The former claim has already been shown to be indefensible, but the latter is worthy of further discussion. Prior to the October revolution, it was in Lenin’s, and other leading Bolsheviks’, best interests to remain incognito. His previous encounters with the Okhrana, in the wake of his brother’s execution in 1887 and after 1903 as part of the clandestine revolutionary underground, had shown him the value of anonymity. Indeed, applying for a passport in 1917 he was forced to shave of his facial hair in order to be successful, and even after the October revolution it took some time for him to grow it back completely. Being totally unrecognizable had its advantages but also its disadvantages it seems. Nonetheless, up to late 1917 Lenin was clearly playing an active role in preventing himself from being widely known, in direct contradiction of White’s views. Lenin’s attempts were so effective, indeed, that “even in the Civil War he had difficulty in getting recognized by the general public”[28]. This goes directly against Tumarkin’s assertion that “the Lenin cult […] developed in the context of the Russian Civil War”[29] – this seems unlikely, except insofar as Lenin was the acknowledged supreme leader of the Reds, and perhaps some echoes of the attempt on his life (see below) were still being felt but not by the Russian population at large. By 1920 when the Civil War was drawing to a close, then, the majority of Russia did not know what Lenin looked like and so to claim that a personality cult existed at this point and that Lenin himself had played a key role in its inception is to exaggerate the situation wildly.

Lenin’s role in creating his own Cult of Personality

Figes also contends that the cult was in existence prior to Lenin’s death but diverges from White’s analysis as he is careful to point out that Lenin played no role in creating it himself (indeed Lenin railed against such an outcome, trying to “put a brake on it when he recovered” from the assassination attempt[30]). The failed attempt on Lenin’s life by Fanny Kaplan on August 30th 1918 after he had spoken at the Hammer and Sickle armaments factory is seen by Figes as the key moment where the cult sprang into existence; “Lenin’s quick recovery was declared a miracle in the Bolshevik press. He was hailed as a Christ-like figure, blessed with supernatural powers, who was not afraid to sacrifice his own life for the good of the people”[31]. Whether, of course, the press beyond the Bolsheviks’ own took as much notice and elevated the attempt so highly seems unlikely. Figes then goes on to say that “[i]t was the start of the Lenin cult – a cult designed by Bolsheviks, apparently against Lenin’s will, to promote their leader as the ‘people’s tsar'”[32]. Figes is therefore in broad agreement with Tumarkin, who more plausibly states that “the first stage of its formation was the spontaneous mythologi[s]ing of Lenin that followed upon an attempt on his life [… o]n 30 August 1918”[33]. They differ importantly, as we have already noted on the use of the word ‘cult’. Here, Figes goes too far but Tumarkin only refers to the reaction only being a first step towards its construction – “the cult of Lenin had been set on its course “[34]. Nonetheless, as a result of Lenin’s virtual resurrection, photos of him appeared in the ‘Lenin Corner’ also known as the ‘Red Corner’ or ‘Holy Spot’ in peasant dwellings[35] (broadly agreeing with Panchenko’s ideas as discussed above). Service corroborates Figes’ assertion that the cult started to be established in the wake of the assassination attempt[36] but without putting a timescale on precisely when. All of these three accounts suffer from a common weakness – none go beyond asserting that a cult existed as early as August 1918, and proceed to provide only scant evidence to prove that this was actually the case. Figes’ account suffers from this fault the least. It seems plausible, but not especially likely, that the Bolshevik press (over which Lenin had tight rein, crucially so as a propaganda weapon against first the Provisional Government and later The Whites in the October Revolution and Civil War respectively) and the Bolshevik leadership (above whom Lenin resided atop the Sovnarkom pyramid, his power here shown for example in pushing through the NEP in 1921 amidst huge opposition and earlier forcing the pace of the seizure of power from the April Theses to the October Revolution itself 6 months later) were able to create such a cult in spite of Lenin’s express wishes. From the point of view of the latter, this would have been hugely insubordinate, and perhaps betray not only the ideals of the revolution itself (eg in creating a quasi-religion which would contradict Marxist principles and also in elevating Lenin into a ‘class’ of his own) but also exacerbate Lenin’s worries about, and later explicit orders against, factionalism[37]. Perhaps, though, we can arrive at a middle ground. If an aura did surround Lenin, from the assassination attempt and later mystical stories which resulted from it, then it was not as part of an officially sanctioned ideology. Instead, it was merely an invention along the lines of Panchenko’s thinking as outlined above. Once again, to claim that a ‘cult’ existed from the point of the assassination onwards is hugely problematic.

Timing

Finally, let us look more closely at the timing of the alleged establishment of the Lenin Cult. We have already found that by the end of the Civil War, Lenin was not well enough known to be said to be surrounded by a Personality Cult. An important effect of Fanya Kaplan’s attempt against Lenin’s life was the legacy of medical difficulties bestowed upon him – she did succeed in killing him, it just took a long time to play out. As a result of one of the three shots fired lodging in Lenin’s neck and leading to multiple strokes, Lenin was often wheelchair-bound. After his second stroke in December 1921, he was allowed to dictate for only ‘5 to 10 minutes a day’. As a result, Lenin had become Stalin’s prisoner[38]. He had also become a prisoner insofar as he was isolated from not only the central party leadership, allowing Stalin crucial opportunities to subvert his wishes, but also from the Russian people themselves. For the next two years or so, Lenin’s health prevented him from interacting effectively with either of these groups, and indeed was so ill and unbeknown to Russians in general and his own Guards in particular that he was denied entry to the Kremlin in 1923[39]! Under such circumstances, it would have been undesirable for ‘the real’ Lenin to be well known but it is possible that at this point it did become desirable for thoughts of how to secure Lenin’s legacy to start forming in the minds of leading Bolsheviks in general and Stalin in particular. For this reason, it is highly plausible that a sanctioned and sanitized version of Lenin was starting to be effected, and the previous concern raised by Figes that Lenin was averse to such a development became moot. “The Cult of Lenin, which Lenin himself opposed and managed to keep in check until incapacitated by a stroke in March 1923”[40] could now start to coalesce for two reasons – firstly because Lenin’s health was so critical that the regime needed to be safeguarded, and that secondly this could, indeed had, to take place now that Lenin was no longer an obstacle to its establishment, being too ill to mount any effective opposition to such a scheme. Tumarkin, therefore, is vindicated in stating that “the elevation of Leninism to the status of holy writ […] developed in 1923 in response to this concern [about life after Lenin] and reached national proportions after Lenin’s death”[41], i.e. the process started during his profound illness but was only fully realized upon his death. Prior to this, it was merely “piecemeal”[42]and disorganized. Only at this point were steps taken to try to safeguard his legacy by, for example, the Moscow Committee setting up a ‘Lenin Institute’ in 1923 to organize, catalogue, preserve and conserve many of Lenin’s documents[43]. Only at this point was a concerted effort made by the regime to “organi[s]e[…] and promote[…]” a cult to act as a “stabili[s]ing and legitimi[s]ing force in Soviet political life”[44]. Between March 1923 and January 1924, therefore, the Cult of Personality of Lenin started to take shape mostly due to Lenin’s inability to stop it. As such, it picked up and started to put together the pieces that we have already examined; Panchenko’s myths, tales and folklore that developed in the wake of the 1918 assassination attempt being the key components. Only at this point were they put together to form the ‘cult’ that Stalin used from that point on.

Lenin as a stepping-stone for Stalin’s rise to power

Therefore, a ‘Cult’ of Personality of Lenin did not exist prior to his death. Events during his premiership may have facilitated planning for the after-Lenin zeitgeist by Stalin and Krupskaya, in particular, and these took on a more urgent aspect in the last ten months of his life. Prior to this, no ‘cult’ existed. This was for a number of reasons. Lenin was not well known enough by the end of the Civil War for us to term what Lenin legends that did exist sufficient for us to accept the existence of a ‘cult’. After 1921, Lenin was so ill that it was undesirable for him to be well known as he actually was, but crucially he was able to retain enough control over his own affairs that he was able to withstand any attempts to create a ‘cult’ against his will. It was only once he was unable to safeguard his own reputation that leading Bolsheviks did so on his behalf. Therefore, Stalin was able to start building his own “cult of impersonality”[45] as a testimony to Lenin’s life and work in the months prior to the latter’s death, but this only started to take full expression as Stalin led the funeral oration to Lenin, crucially with Trotsky absent, on January 28th 1924. In the same way that in Stalin’s regime, “Kirov’s murder provided an ideal pretext [to] solidify[] the power of the dictator […] The bonds of institutional and clan loyalties, along with the vestiges of collective leadership and intraparty democracy, were the last impediments to sole and unquestioned power”[46], Stalin’s construction of the Lenin Cult after his death was the first crucial step to removing the first ‘impediments’ to Stalin’s path to power as Lenin’s sole successor.

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Bibliography

Figes, O 1996: “A People’s Tragedy”. Pimlico, London.

Fitzpatrick, S 2008: “The Russian Revolution”. OUP, Oxford.

Khlevniuk, O 2015: “Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator”. Yale University Press, New Haven.

Lenin, V 1922: “Continuation of the notes” to the “Last Will & Testament”.  Accessed online from https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/dec/testamnt/congress.htm

Lenin Q IN Dewey, J. 1929: “Impressions of Soviet Russia and the revolutionary world”. New Republic Inc, New York.

Montefiore, S 2014: “Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar”. Phoenix Books, London.

Panachenko, A 2005: “The Cult of Lenin and ‘Soviet Folklore’”. Folklorica X (1); 18-38.

Service, R 2000: “Lenin”. MacMillan, London.

Service, R 2004: “Stalin”. MacMillan, London.

Tucker, R 1979: “The rise of Stalin’s Personality Cult”. The American Historical Review 84 (2); 347-366.

Tumarkin, N 1981: “Religion, Bolshevism, and the Origins of the Lenin Cult”. The Russian Review 40 (1); 35-46.

Tumarkin, N 1983: “Political Ritual and the Cult of Lenin”. Human Rights Quarterly 5 (2); 203-6.

White, D 2001: “Lenin – The Practice and Theory of Revolution”. Palgrave, Basingstoke.

[1] Service 2004; 221

[2] Fitzpatrick 2008; 111

[3] Tumarkin 1981; 38

[4] Service 2000; 483

[5] Tumarkin 1981; 46

[6] Tumarkin 1983; 205

[7] Tumarkin 1981; 39

[8] Tumarkin 1981; 46

[9] Tumarkin 1981; 44

[10] Tumarkin 1983; 204

[11] Service 2004; 218

[12] Service 2004; 221

[13] Service 2004; 221

[14] Montefiore 2014; 66

[15] Service 2004; 357

[16] Service 2004; 309

[17] Lenin Q IN Dewey 1929; 145

[18] Khlevniuk2015; 39

[19] Panchenko 2005; 19

[20] Panchenko 2005; 20

[21] Panchenko 2005; 19

[22] Panchenko 2005; 21

[23] Panchencko 2005; 22

[24] Panchenko 2005; 21

[25] Panchenko 2005; 24

[26] Tumarkin 1981; 37

[27] White 2001; 185

[28] Service 2000; 9

[29] Tumarkin 1983; 204

[30] Figes 1996; 628

[31] Figes 1996; 627

[32] Figes 1996; 628

[33] Tumarkin 1983; 204

[34] Tumarkin 1983; 205

[35] Figes 1996; 629

[36] Service 2000; 393

[37] Lenin 1922; 3

[38] Figes 1996; 797

[39] Service 2000; 476

[40] Tucker 1979; 347

[41] Tumarkin 1981; 36

[42] Tumarkin 1983; 204

[43] Tumarkin 1983; 205

[44] Tumarkin 1981; 37

[45] Service 2004: 357

[46] Khlevniuk 2015; 137